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What follows is a much abridged version of a section of the opening chapter of the official history of criminal justice between 1959 and 1997 which David Downes, Tim Newburn and I were formally commissioned to write some six and a half years ago. Our work has been based on numerous archives, secondary sources and interviews, but the principal resource, and the principal archive, the repository of government records, the 'strong box of the Empire', is the National Archive at Kew, and it is on record management there that I shall dwell.
One thing that struck us almost immediately, and struck us by surprise, was that whole areas of criminal justice history that might have been documented in that archive are now blank and irretrievable. Over and over again, we stumbled upon voids in the historical evidence, and we all too often found ourselves floundering and foundering. Thus, although the papers of all Royal Commissions and many interdepartmental committees are meticulously preserved, the material that must once have documented the deliberations that initiated them, and the material that documented their consequences, may no longer remain. There are no files in the Home office relating to Michael Williams, the prisoner whose incarceration in Wakefield control unit in 1974 caused a furore which led to their closure; none on the decision taken in 1929 to appoint a Select Committee on capital punishment, and none on what government made of it; none on the decision to appoint the Wolfenden Committee, and none on what government made of it; none on the Home Secretary's decision to accede to representations made in support of an appeal against the conviction of three young men for the death of Maxwell Confait, none on the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure that stemmed from the appeal, and none on the establishment of the CPS that flowed from the Royal Commission. And so it goes on. So much has been lost.
It accordingly seemed sensible to take an expedition to explore how it came about that record-keeping in the latter half of the twentieth century seemed to have been organised as much by a desire to destroy materials as to preserve them. It offers an interesting small exercise in the sociology of knowledge, examining how the past can be made visible, i and what follows is a much abridged and simplified account of why so many records have been lost over the years.
The predecessor of the National Archives, the Public Record Office, had been founded in 1838 as part of a Benthamite State-building project. It housed not only papers stretching back to the beginnings of record-keeping, but also the flow of documents continuously generated by an increasingly energetic state. It was a flow that came into time to clog up and overwhelm not only the PRO but also the Government departments which generated it, and officials were at a loss about what to do.
The Archives fell constitutionally under the supervision of the Master of the Rolls, the second most senior judge in England and Wales, and, as his name suggested, the keeper of the rolls. But their active management during the 1940s and 1950s, a critical period, was entrusted to a deputy keeper, Sir Hilary Jenkinson, acknowledged to be the chief authority on record-keeping practice in the English-speaking world. It was his firm contention that the role of the archivist was solely to receive and conserve the documents that were entrusted to him by administrators, that their decision about what to submit should be sovereign, and that he could not and should not exercise any discretion in the matter of selection, because the archivist's discretion would inevitably reflect ephemeral prejudices. Historians, too, were deemed to be ill-equipped to judge the possible future value of materials offered for deposit in Chancery Lane because scholarly tastes and interests would inevitably shift in unpredictable fashion.
The outcome was simple. In the period up to and during the Second World investigation. He says that he is the world authority on the subject and that everything will be simple if only his methods are adopted at once'.
His colleague, Edward Playfair, concurred: concurred, and I hope those of a sensitive disposition will not be shocked by the language I am about to quote. Sir Hilary, he said, was an 'old mountain of prejudice', 'a real cough-drop. . . . he talks incessantly and is perfectly convinced that he knows all the answers'. The committee would have 'the most awful time'
x if Sir Hilary were allowed to join it. And if Sir Hilary were excluded, so, it was argued, should every other civil servant from the PRO.
The Grigg committee was consequently bereft of archival experts. Its emphasis was not on how to choose, house and preserve records. It was on how to destroy them. A pressing crisis demanded a pressing solution, and the committee's formal terms of reference would be to 'review the arrangements for the preservation of the records of Government departments . . . in the light of the rate at which they are accumulating and of the purposes which they are intended to serve'. xi Its conclusion was not unpredictable. There was, it said, a manifest and urgent need to reduce the volume of records that could and should be saved. 'Few of these', it declared, 'will need to be preserved, but their very number greatly complicates the process of deciding which should be preserved, and which destroyed'. Government ministries were in their turn to appoint a suitable internal official, a Departmental Records Officer, xx to take charge of their papers, review them five years after they had 'passed out of active use ' (para. 80) and then destroy those which were no longer needed xxi (and the first such officers were nominated in May 1956 -there were to be officers in post in 64 Departments by the end of the next year). Any records not thus discarded were to be reviewed again after 25 years, and those deemed no longer to be of historical or administrative importance were to be destroyed (para. 87). Records that did succeed in passing that second muster were to be kept only if they were thought still to be of administrative use, and the remainder were to be sent for safekeeping to the Public Record Office (although the criteria for identifying historical importance were not clearly identified at the time). That was not to be the end of the matter. Attrition could continue. The archivists of the Public Record Office were obliged to keep their own stock of documents under 'continuous review' and, in consultation with the relevant Departments, dispose of those which were thought no longer to justify retention.
Only latterly, and as guidelines for departmental record officers of which -or some 27% -were destroyed, and 225 feet, or 16% were retained for second review. 1202 feet of policy files -or 95% -were destroyed, and 35 feet -or 3% -were then selected for the PRO at second review. No doubt much that is lost is of little or no value, but the lacunae that the three of us continually encountered are there, and some of them are baffling indeed. ii 'Time', he said, 'does his weeding through the agency of officials working by rules. . . . ' Insufficiently valuable documents were to be destroyed, but 'Unfortunately, the criteria of value are variable and subjective'. And the task had grown to such proportions that 'I doubt whether the old procedures of the Public Record Office can cope with it. . . . Some of the most precious grain of war-historical record never got into the registered files and may therefore never come to the Public Record Office: conversely, in the registered files of the war period there are tares by the million; but good wheat is mingled with the tares. How can they be separated?' 'The History of our Times', The Webb Memorial Lecture, 1950 
